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Linking OpenSSL cost every pure-serve 2.3 MiB of resident memory, 0.66
MiB of it the process's own (relocated data), though most servers never
reach an https receiver or seal a send. The code that uses OpenSSL (TLS
to https receivers, sealing) is now built as pure-crypto.so beside
pure-serve and exports one table; pure-serve maps it the first time a
wire to an https URL opens or a key is read or a seal wired
(serve/crypto.c), and a missing library is reported at startup. What
needs no OpenSSL, a key's hex and the suite this CPU seals with, stays in
pure-serve.
An idle server: RSS 4,496 -> 2,320 kB, PSS 1,639 -> 881 kB, private
dirty 1,296 -> 864 kB. A static OpenSSL was measured too and is worse
(RSS 3.8 MiB, but 2.3 MiB private: all of its tables relocated). The
checks, https webhooks and sealed sends included, pass unchanged.
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--seal OUTPUT=KEY seals each request's body whole to the receiving node's
public key with HPKE (RFC 9180, base mode: X25519, HKDF-SHA256, AES-128-GCM
where the CPU has AES, else ChaCha20-Poly1305), bound to the request's
source, first number and count; X-Pure-Seal names the suite. A receiver's
--key is a raw 32-byte file, made 0600 when missing, held in OpenSSL's
secure heap; it opens the body where it lies (400 seal when it does not
open) and zeroes the plain text when the request's ticket goes.
--sealed-only refuses unsealed deliveries (403 unsealed).
The check puts a recording relay between two apps: every order applies
once, no body shows an item or a field name, a flipped bit is refused, a
replayed request applies nothing twice, and a seal to another key does not
open. Its hosts choose their own ports (--port 0). Sealed sends drain at
233-235k a second against 469-470k plain (Raspberry Pi 5): three X25519
operations a request, 164 us each. The plain request path measured the
same as before.
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