Close what an attacker on the path could do to a link, each checked

test-link now also plays an attacker: packets changed on the way,
packets of the past sent again from the sender's address and its own,
keys and sources not allowed, and a flood of made-up packets. It found:

- A nonce used twice: a receiver sealed every answer in its one run, and
  a sender at rest coming back with the same run got a new slot whose
  answers began at number 0 again under the same key. Each slot now
  draws the run its answers are sealed in.
- A link stopped for good by one packet of the past: a stream that did
  not know its last heard (after a restart or a rest) handed over from
  its first record held, and a stale part of an old one never came
  whole. It hands over from its first whole record.
- Answers taken away: any packet that opened, however old, moved where
  answers went. Only the newest of its run moves it now; a new address
  is sent a challenge the sender says back (CHALLENGE, RESPONSE), and
  until then gets at most three times the bytes that came from it.
- An answer made by a packet that did not open: a number heard before
  was acknowledged before the packet was opened. It is opened first.
- An old answer lowering the sender's credit, or its gap making it send
  again: the sender now sends up to the most heard and credit it was
  told, and takes a gap only from a word not older than it knows.
- Ten thousand made-up packets made ten thousand keys: keys made for a
  run that did not open now cost a token, 256 a second.

Counts now say runs keyed and secrets made.

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